SecHive is an operator-grade autonomous pentesting workbench. Every finding ships with replayable evidence, signed attestation, and a chain a human reviewer can actually defend — across pentest, bug bounty, source audit, mobile and RE modes.
Scanners give you a long list of maybes. Agentic frameworks give you a long transcript. Both leave the human operator to reconstruct what happened, what was actually proven, and what is safe to put in a report.
SecHive collapses that gap. The runtime writes its own audit trail as it works, so the report is the artifact — not the starting point.
replay.sh in the proof pack.SecHive is not a single prompt. It is a controlled pipeline that enforces scope, routes signals into specialist skills, plans hypotheses, validates them at runtime, preserves negative evidence, and only then promotes a candidate to a finding.
Anything in security can be made to look impressive in a transcript. SecHive's loop is designed to make the same work survivable: when a finding is challenged in client review, on a HackerOne triage queue, or in a SOC 2 audit — the chain is already there.
Walk through the platform →SecHive is local-first. The operator UI shows running campaigns, hypothesis graphs, evidence drawers, replay buttons and approval queues — all served from the same machine that holds your scope.
/v1/execuser_id param — numeric enumeration, no ownership check observed/submitPentest, bug bounty, own-source bug hunt, mobile, reverse engineering and PR audit are different flows — different signals, different scope, different evidence standards. SecHive treats them that way instead of reusing one prompt with a different label.
SecHive's public proof is intentionally split. The redacted bug bounty corpus shows real-world breadth. The Juice Shop reports are full-fidelity and reproducible. The XBOW-style campaign sits between the two as a controlled benchmark.
Ninety sanitized results across business logic, source-first policy, cross-domain reasoning, identity, mobile and protocol.
Full unredacted black-box and white-box reports against the current 111-challenge tree. Routes, payloads, source references and evidence snippets retained.
One hundred and four recorded validation cases, paired black-box and white-box. 99 black-box wins, 104 white-box wins, 100% any-win.
SecHive renders evidence matrices for SOC 2, ISO/IEC 27001, NIS 2, DORA, PCI DSS 4.0 and HIPAA — preserving the boundary that compliance ultimately depends on organizational controls and auditor review.
Cybersecurity risk-management measures for essential and important entities. Evidence covers § (a) risk analysis, § (e) effectiveness testing, § (g) cyber hygiene.
Open vertical →Digital Operational Resilience Act. Threat-led penetration testing for financial entities, with chain-of-evidence retention and ICT third-party scope.
Open vertical →Penetration testing of the cardholder-data environment. SecHive proof packs satisfy 11.4.1–11.4.5 and segmentation evidence.
Open vertical →Common criteria evidence for vulnerability identification and threat detection, packaged for Type I and Type II reporting.
Open vertical →Annex A controls for technical vulnerability management and security testing in development and acceptance.
Open vertical →Periodic technical and non-technical evaluation evidence for covered entities and business associates.
Open vertical →Runtime authorization replay is one of SecHive's most-cited public-safe write-ups. The pattern is small. The proof shape is what makes it credible to a triager who has seen a thousand vague reports.
A signed runtime authorization carries a nonce-like value. bizlogic_hunter flags the value as never observed in durable state.
The relayer submits the signed action. The validation function returns OK. The execution wrapper performs the privileged side effect.
The same authorization bytes are submitted again, unmodified. The nonce is not consumed; the digest validates.
The privileged side effect occurs a second time. The invariant "one signed authorization authorizes one execution" is broken.
SecHive promotes the candidate. The proof pack contains: the signed payload, two execution receipts, side-effect deltas, the validation source path, a cosigned attestation, and a deterministic replay.sh.
Every SecHive run produces both: the human-facing report (mode-specific) and a machine-readable proof pack — provenance, redaction manifest, artifact index and attestation — that downstream tooling can verify or replay.
# sechive-proof-pack/replay.sh — sha256:7c3a… set -euo pipefail TARGET="https://lab.example.invalid" AUTH="$(cat artifacts/signed-authorization.b64)" # first execution — expected OK curl -sS -X POST "$TARGET/v1/exec" \ -H "X-Authorization: $AUTH" \ -d @artifacts/payload.json | tee out/01.json # replay — invariant broken if 200 OK curl -sS -X POST "$TARGET/v1/exec" \ -H "X-Authorization: $AUTH" \ -d @artifacts/payload.json | tee out/02.json diff <(jq .receipt out/01.json) <(jq .receipt out/02.json) \ && echo "REPLAY ACCEPTED — finding confirmed" \ || echo "replay rejected — invariant holds"
SecHive is local-first. Pilots run against your own infrastructure or against a controlled lab — never against systems you don't own or aren't explicitly authorized to test.