● FrameworkSOC 2 (TSC)AICPACC4 / CC7 / CC8
Compliance / SOC 2 (TSC)
§ SOC 2 (TSC)
A technical-research reference for SOC 2 criteria.
This page illustrates how research artifacts may relate to selected CC4, CC7, and CC8 criteria. It does not represent a SOC 2 audit, opinion, or claim of compliance.
Important boundary. This page is an illustrative reference mapping. Framework references describe evidence mapping and control alignment. SecHive is not presently certified or independently audited under these frameworks unless explicitly stated. This page is not legal advice, evidence that SecHive implements these controls, or a claim that any organization satisfies SOC 2 (TSC).
§ Articles → Evidence
How research artifacts may relate to SOC 2 (TSC).
The mapping is intentionally narrow and illustrative. The final relevance and sufficiency of evidence must be determined by the organization and its qualified assessor.
| Article / control | What it requires | SecHive artifact |
|---|---|---|
| CC4.1 | Evaluate the design and operating effectiveness of controls. | Per-finding evidence chain with reviewer disposition and retest. |
| CC7.1 | Use of detection and monitoring procedures to identify changes. | Reproducible exploit chains feed detection engineering and tabletop input. |
| CC7.2 | Monitor system components and the operation of those components for anomalies. | Negative evidence and refutation log support anomaly-vs-vulnerability triage. |
| CC7.3 | Evaluate security events to determine response. | Severity, impact, and remediation guidance bound to each promoted finding. |
| CC7.4 | Respond to identified security incidents. | Replay scripts allow IR teams to verify scope of an issue post-fix. |
| CC8.1 | Authorize, design, develop or acquire, configure, document, test, approve, and implement changes. | PR-audit mode produces per-change evidence at integration time. |
§ Review view
How artifacts can be organized.
A practical format for technical review; acceptance by an auditor or assessor is not implied.
For the CISO
- Mappable evidence per Article 21(2) sub-clause.
- Time-bounded findings with severity and impact.
- Retest records that close the loop with the engineering team.
For the legal / compliance team
- Redaction manifests for cross-border or supplier engagements.
- Operator identity recorded on every disposition.
- Artifact hashes on report bundles.
For engineering
- Deterministic
replay.shper finding. - Source references when source mode is enabled.
- Negative evidence for refuted candidates.
For the auditor
- Run-mode-labeled evidence rows.
- sha256 binding to underlying artifacts.
- Methodology spine consistent across engagements.
§ Sample evidence
A page from the matrix.
SecHive renders an evidence matrix per engagement. Below is one row, redacted.
EVIDENCE ROW — sample
# evidence-row.yaml — redacted control: CC7.1 # effectiveness testing finding_id: VTX-RPL-0042 mode: black-box target: redacted target_ref: image@sha256:9c4e… # pinned artifact: path: artifacts/replay.sh sha256: 7c3a… review: human-approved disposition: reviewer: redacted-operator state: confirmed retest: status: fixed @ 2026-04-18 evidence: artifacts/retest-receipt.json
What a reviewer sees
- The control id and the finding id, bound together.
- A run-mode label (black-box, source-aware, etc.).
- A sha256 of the underlying artifact.
- A reviewer disposition with operator identity.
- A retest record if the finding has been remediated.
Discuss a SOC 2 (TSC) reference mapping.
Bring an authorized scope and the evidence questions you are working through.