FrameworkDORAEU 2022/2554Articles 24–28

Compliance / DORA

§ DORA

Threat-led testing with a chain that survives the supervisor.

The Digital Operational Resilience Act requires financial entities to run threat-led penetration testing on critical functions and to manage ICT third-party risk. SecHive produces the per-finding chain that makes both defensible.

FrameworkDORA
JurisdictionEU 2022/2554
ReferenceArticles 24–28
ScopeFinancial entities & ICT third parties
SecHive evidencetechnical
Auditor opinionout of scope
§ Articles → Evidence

Where SecHive evidence fits in DORA.

The mapping is intentionally narrow. We list only the articles where SecHive produces a directly defensible artifact, and we name the artifact.

Article / controlWhat it requiresSecHive artifact
Art. 24 — Testing programmeSound and comprehensive ICT security testing programme.Per-engagement scope policy, methodology spine, retained proof packs.
Art. 25 — Vulnerability assessmentVulnerability assessments, scans, source code reviews, scenario-based tests.SecHive run modes cover all four — clearly labeled per finding.
Art. 26 — TLPTThreat-led penetration testing on critical functions.Threat-scenario hypothesis graph; benign-PoC validation under scope guard.
Art. 27 — TLPT testersRequirements on testers and methodology.Auditable identity + methodology label on every finding; operator-controlled.
Art. 28 — ICT third-party riskSound management of ICT third-party risk.Source-audit and PR-audit modes for supplier artifacts and integration points.
§ Buyer view

SecHive provides.

What you can put in front of an auditor or a security review.

For the CISO

  • Mappable evidence per Article 21(2) sub-clause.
  • Time-bounded findings with severity and impact.
  • Retest records that close the loop with the engineering team.

For the legal / compliance team

  • Redaction manifests for cross-border or supplier engagements.
  • Operator identity stamped on every disposition.
  • Cosigned attestation on report bundles.

For engineering

  • Deterministic replay.sh per finding.
  • Source references when source mode is enabled.
  • Negative evidence for refuted candidates.

For the auditor

  • Run-mode-labeled evidence rows.
  • sha256 binding to underlying artifacts.
  • Methodology spine consistent across engagements.
§ Sample evidence

A page from the matrix.

SecHive renders an evidence matrix per engagement. Below is one row, redacted.

EVIDENCE ROW — sample
# evidence-row.yaml — redacted
control:    Art. 26 (TLPT)  # effectiveness testing
finding_id: VTX-RPL-0042
mode:       black-box
target:     redacted
target_ref: image@sha256:9c4e…  # pinned
artifact:
  path:    artifacts/replay.sh
  sha256:  7c3a…
  signed:  cosign:sechive-key
disposition:
  reviewer:  redacted-operator
  state:    confirmed
retest:
  status:    fixed @ 2026-04-18
  evidence:  artifacts/retest-receipt.json

What an auditor sees

  • The control id and the finding id, bound together.
  • A run-mode label (black-box, source-aware, etc.).
  • A sha256 of the underlying artifact.
  • A reviewer disposition with operator identity.
  • A retest record if the finding has been remediated.
See the full output matrix

Run a DORA-shaped pilot.

Bring the scope and the auditor's evidence list. We will produce the technical artifacts.