● FrameworkDORAEU 2022/2554Articles 24–28
Compliance / DORA
§ DORA
Threat-led testing with a chain that survives the supervisor.
The Digital Operational Resilience Act requires financial entities to run threat-led penetration testing on critical functions and manage ICT third-party risk. This page maps a research evidence chain to selected provisions for reference.
Important boundary. This page is an illustrative reference mapping. Framework references describe evidence mapping and control alignment. SecHive is not presently certified or independently audited under these frameworks unless explicitly stated. This page is not legal advice, evidence that SecHive implements these controls, or a claim that any organization satisfies DORA.
§ Articles → Evidence
How research artifacts may relate to DORA.
The mapping is intentionally narrow and illustrative. The final relevance and sufficiency of evidence must be determined by the organization and its qualified assessor.
| Article / control | What it requires | SecHive artifact |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 24 — Testing programme | Sound and comprehensive ICT security testing programme. | Per-engagement scope policy, methodology spine, retained proof packs. |
| Art. 25 — Vulnerability assessment | Vulnerability assessments, scans, source code reviews, scenario-based tests. | SecHive run modes cover all four — clearly labeled per finding. |
| Art. 26 — TLPT | Threat-led penetration testing on critical functions. | Threat-scenario hypothesis graph; benign-PoC validation under scope guard. |
| Art. 27 — TLPT testers | Requirements on testers and methodology. | Auditable identity + methodology label on every finding; operator-controlled. |
| Art. 28 — ICT third-party risk | Sound management of ICT third-party risk. | Source-audit and PR-audit modes for supplier artifacts and integration points. |
§ Review view
How artifacts can be organized.
A practical format for technical review; acceptance by an auditor or assessor is not implied.
For the CISO
- Mappable evidence per Article 21(2) sub-clause.
- Time-bounded findings with severity and impact.
- Retest records that close the loop with the engineering team.
For the legal / compliance team
- Redaction manifests for cross-border or supplier engagements.
- Operator identity recorded on every disposition.
- Artifact hashes on report bundles.
For engineering
- Deterministic
replay.shper finding. - Source references when source mode is enabled.
- Negative evidence for refuted candidates.
For the auditor
- Run-mode-labeled evidence rows.
- sha256 binding to underlying artifacts.
- Methodology spine consistent across engagements.
§ Sample evidence
A page from the matrix.
SecHive renders an evidence matrix per engagement. Below is one row, redacted.
EVIDENCE ROW — sample
# evidence-row.yaml — redacted control: Art. 26 (TLPT) # effectiveness testing finding_id: VTX-RPL-0042 mode: black-box target: redacted target_ref: image@sha256:9c4e… # pinned artifact: path: artifacts/replay.sh sha256: 7c3a… review: human-approved disposition: reviewer: redacted-operator state: confirmed retest: status: fixed @ 2026-04-18 evidence: artifacts/retest-receipt.json
What a reviewer sees
- The control id and the finding id, bound together.
- A run-mode label (black-box, source-aware, etc.).
- A sha256 of the underlying artifact.
- A reviewer disposition with operator identity.
- A retest record if the finding has been remediated.
Discuss a DORA reference mapping.
Bring an authorized scope and the evidence questions you are working through.